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ferred to in the second paragraph of this article has not been remedied and still exists. Perhaps the confusion has been increased by the
very act that was meant to remove it.
NATHAN

W.

HELLER.

WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENCE.
Undue influence in the law of Wills
is a subject of vital importance, in that the validity or non-validity of
the instrument purporting to be a will is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the various elements essential to constitute such undue
influence.
The supreme court of Wisconsin In re Jackman's Will, 26 Wis.
104, held that undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will, must be of
such a nature as to in some degree destroy the free agency of the testator and constrain him to do something against his will, so as to virtually render the testamentary act the will of another rather than that of
the testator. That is, to constitute undue influence in the eyes of the law
sufficient to set aside a will there must not only be an opportunity to
influence, a disposition to influence and the coveted result, but the
obtaining of the result must be by coercion of the testator.' In stressing
the fact that coercion was a necessary element to establish undue influence many cases have held that such influence must be so exercised
as to amount to moral coercion; resulting in destroying the testator's
2
free will and independent action.
In re Slinger's Will, 72 Wis. 22, 37 N.W. 236, the evidence showed
that the testator, a man about 70 years of age, who had been a habitual
drunkard for 50 years and had become a victim of an uncontrolable
appetite for drinking, suddenly inherited considerable property from a
daughter whom he had not seen since she was a child; that he was
placed under guardianship as a spendthrift; that he went, against the
will of his guardian, to live with his younger brother, who was a saloon
keeper and had offered him a home as long as he lived, with full and
free opportunity to drink when and what he pleased while there; and
that after drinking to some extent, he made a will giving all property
to such brother. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding that such will was the result of undue influence and
refused probate of the instrument as the will of the testator, laying
down the well-settled rule, that where the party to be benefited by the

I In re Bocker's Will, 167 Wis. 100, 166. N.W. 660.
2 Anderson v. Laugen, 122 Wis. 57, 99 N.W. 437. In re Evenson's Will, 152 Wis.
113, 139 N.W. 766.
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will has control, influence, or agency, or is particularly active in procuring execution of the will, this is regarded as a very suspicious circumstance requiring the fullest explanation, especially where such active agent occupies a confidential relation to such testator.
It is a well-settled principle of law in this jurisdiction that the evidence showing the exercise of undue influence to set aside the will
must be clear and satisfactory. It cannot rest on mere preponderance
of the evidence in favor of the invalidity of the will. That is, the proof
must be affirmative and, at the same time, clear, convincing and satisfactory.'
In the case of Elliott v. Fisk, 162 Wis. 249, 155 N.W. 110, the
testator, a bachelor 64 years of age, at the time of his death, left a
one-seventh undivided interest in a farm valued at $15,000. At various
times the testator, prior to his death, expressed dissatisfaction with his
father and brothers because he could not get his one-seventh undivided
interest of his mother's estate. His life was spent in various kinds of
work and at different places. About seven years before his death, testator made his home with Jess McCullough, the residuary legatee. Fisk,
the other legatee, was an old friend of his but the friendship with him
was no greater than that of other friends. Prior to his death testator
lived as a hermit. The Tuesday previous to the Friday on which testator died, he was taken from his house by McCullough on a cot and
brought to the boarding house of Fisk. The week before that he was
so sick and weak that he was unable to take any nourishment. In fact
at the time of the execution of the will he had to be assisted in holding
the pen and guided in making his mark.
The trial court further found that the beneficiaries exerted undue
influence on the testator and' accordingly refused probate of the will,
because there was a portrayal of actual exertion of physical influence
enough to prima facie establish the existence of undue influence. The
supreme court affirmed the holding of the trial court on the ground
that the deceased never expressed any intention of making a will, because he considered that he had very little if anything to leave. Testator
was susceptible to undue influence especially at the time the will was
made owing to the extremely weakened and enfeebled condition from
which he was suffering. An opportunity to exercise undue influence
existed for Testator was in the house of the proponent of the purported will before he died. In addition there was the fact that the properiy was left to absolute strangers, both by blood and marriage, and
the exclusion of the testator's aged father and other near relatives with
3 Will of Emerson, 183 Wis. 437, 198 N.W. 441; Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27,
141 N.W. 8; Will of Boardman, 178 Wis. 517, 190 N.W. 355.
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whom he was on 'especially good terms. In support of their position
the supreme court cited; Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 141 N.W. 8;
Duncan v. Metcalf, 154 Wis. 39, 141 N.W. 1002; Skrinsrud v.
Schwenn, 158 Wis. 142, 147 N.W. 370; Gunderson v. Rogers, 160 Wis.
468, 152 N.W. 157.
This case states the rule to be that evidence that disposition
is the
result of undue influence may be drawn from the fact that the beneficiaries as seeking to retain that which was gratuitously given them
and from the fact that the result appears to have been the effect of
such influence, and is therefore in the last analysis an unnatural will.
Courts have been so firm in this holding that in 185 Wis. 407, 201
N.W. 826, Estate of Wegner, the supreme court reversed the county
court who refused to allow probate of the will on ground that it was
made while under undue influence, and in holding that before undue
influence can be established it must be of such a character as to destroy
the free agency of the testator and substitute for his intention that of
another. The supreme court said that the fact that the testator's reason
is convinced by persuasion and argument is not sufficient to constitute
undue influence if the document is executed according to his own will
and intention. This same rule was again emphasized in Will of Lotwin,
186 Wis. 42.
These cases have been to a certain degree over-ruled by the Will of
Link, reported in 202 Wis. 1, where the supreme court pointedly differentiates the distinction between the various forms of force and
coercion necessary for undue influence and in the final analysis holds
that the force or coercion be inferred from the other existing essential
elements, breaking away from the principle heretofore established and
adhered to.
The facts of the case were substantially as follows: The testator,
81 years of age and a resident of Milwaukee County, owned some
property in the City of Milwaukee from which the rents yielded him
a monthly income. In addition to that he received a monthly pension
from the government. The evidence further showed that he denied
himself not only the comforts but the necessities of life. In January,
1928, the testator had a serious illness and subsequently suffered poor
health. A divorced daughter kept house for him and had her children
with her, one of whom was a boy whose noisy and boisterous conduct
greatly irritated the deceased. In July, 1928 the testator's daughter took
the bdy to Chicago for the purpose of turning him over to her divorced
husband, leaving her daughter to keep house. During the absence of
the testator's daughter, Chris Monday, 62 years of age and Mayme
Monday, 45 years of age, a nephew and niece of the testator came from
Oshkosh to Milwaukee and urged the testator to go with them to Osh-
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kosh, representing, among other things, that they had a cottage on the
lake where he could enjoy the sunshine and fresh air to benefit his
health. The testator accompanied them *and the Mondays devoted themselves to his care and comfort. Prior to this time the intimacy between
the nephew and niece and that of the testator was that of comparative
strangers.
On September 10, Mayme, the preferred niece, called an attorney
to her cottage and the testator executed a will leaving his entire estate
to Chris and Mayme Monday. On September 20, 1928, at 3:30 in the
morning the testator died. In the forenoon of the same day, the petition for probate of the will executed on September 10, was filed in the
county court of Winnebago, before any arrangements were made for
the funeral or the relatives notified.
Contestants of the will are his children and until July 1, 1928, cordial relations existed between the testator and his children, evidenced
by testator's executing one will on February 9, 1928, and another on
June 9, 1928, in both of which he left to them all of his disposable
estate in equal shares.
At the time of the execution of the will, offered for probate the
testator was of sound mind and of sufficient mental capacity to make a
will, although he labored under delusions with reference to his children.
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the county court admitting to probate on the ground that it was produced by undue influence.
The important feature of this case is the establishing of the rule that
where three of the four elements necessary to establish undue influence
are present namely: one, a fit, easy subject; second, an opportunity for
exercising undue influence; and third, a result indicating its 'xercise,
a prima facie case of undue influence is established and the fourth
element of force may be inferred from the three existing elements. So
in this case where the evidence conclusively established by clear and
satisfactory evidence the three elements, the court inferred the fourth.
GERTRUDE SPRACKER.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CITIZENS - NATURALIZATION - United
States v. Macintosh, 51 S. Ct. Rep. 570. By the barest majority the
United States Supreme Court denied citizenship to the applicant
Macintosh, a Canadian born Baptist minister, chaplain and professor
of theology at Yale University.
He was denied citizenship because he was unwilling to take the
oath of allegiance unqualifiedly. He asserted that he was willing to
take up arms in defense of this country except in a war which he

